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Forecasting the Outcome of Closed-Door Decisions: evidence from 500 years of betting 
on papal conclaves. 
 
Abstract 
Closed-door decisions may be defined as decisions in which the outcome is determined by a 
limited number of decision-makers and where the process is shrouded in at least some 
secrecy.  In this paper, we examine the use of betting markets to forecast on particular closed-
door decision, the election of the Pope.  Within the context of 500 years of papal election 
betting, we employ a unique dataset of betting on the 2013 papal election to investigate how 
new public information is incorporated into the betting odds.  Our results suggest that the 
market was generally unable to incorporate effectively such information.  We venture some 
possible explanations for our findings and offer suggestions for further research into the 
prediction and predictability of other ‘closed-door’ decisions. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
The forecasting of decision-making in the context of elections and public policy is the subject 
of an extensive literature.  An increasingly significant part of this work considers the 
relevance and efficiency of betting or prediction markets in making these decisions (e.g. 
Page, 2011; Saville et al., 2011).  Betting on election outcomes has a long history, and is 
particularly well-documented in the case of presidential elections in the US (Rhode and 
Strumpf, 2013).  It has indeed been traced, according to contemporaries, back to the election 
of George Washington and has existed in organized markets since the administration of 
Abraham Lincoln. 
Within the context of political betting and forecasting, we can distinguish between 
open- and closed-door decisions.  The former are open to public scrutiny whilst the latter can 
be defined as decisions taken by an individual or group of individuals whose choices are 
shrouded, at least from outsiders, in a layer of secrecy.  Examples of closed-door decisions 
include court rulings and verdicts. 
The forecasting of closed-door decisions has attracted a less extensive literature, 
confined for the most part to the prediction of Supreme Court rulings (e.g. Epstein et al, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2009; Ruger et al., 2004), and only a very small part of this literature 
considers the relevance or efficiency of betting or prediction markets in making these 
decisions (Blackman et al., 2012; Cherry and Rogers, 2006).1 
This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature in the context of a closed door 
decision for which betting markets have existed for at least 500 years, the outcome of papal 
conclaves.  The decision over the choice of Pope is of considerable significance for a number 
of reasons.  The Pope is perhaps the last absolute monarch (Padovano and Wintrobe, 2013) 
and, as such, exercises a very significant degree of influence over the shape and direction of 
the Catholic Church.  In turn this has a direct impact on the lives of millions of Catholics 
world-wide.  Further, due to the widespread activities of the Church in the fields of health, 
                                                          
1 Nevertheless, a recent analysis of the 2012 Supreme Court decision about the ‘Affordable Care Act’ 
does support the value of expert forecasters in predicting Court decisions (Vaughan Williams, 2014).  In 
particular, the eventual outcome was one which might have been read months before the decision through close 
scrutiny of the findings of the American Bar Association’s (2012) survey of a select group of Supreme Court 
experts.  In this respect, the expert forecasters performed significantly better than the real-money exchange 
betting market. 
 
education, economic development and diplomacy, the selection of a Pope has a global 
significance well beyond the immediate sphere of the Catholic Church. 
This is also an interesting type of election in that the electorate might be regarded as 
relatively ‘non-complex’, defined by Jottier et al. (2012) in terms of size and heterogeneity. 
Jottier et al. argue that in such cases, prediction accuracy should be high relative to where 
there are larger, more heterogeneous electorates. 
The specific focus of this paper is to examine how efficiently (or otherwise) the papal 
betting markets were able to incorporate both public and private information revealed during 
the course of the conclave.  In this task, we are fortunate in having access to a unique dataset 
which provides detailed information on the betting market for every potential papal 
contender.  In the next section of the paper, we draw together several sources to summarise 
what is known about gambling in historical papal elections.  We then explain the background 
and context for betting on the 2013 conclave.  In section 4, we introduce our data and the 
empirical methodology we employ.  Finally we report and discuss our empirical results. 
 
2. Betting on Papal Elections: the historical context 
The first recorded example of betting on a papal election can be traced to the papal conclave 
of September, 1503, at which time it was considered already “an old practice” (Baumgartner, 
2003 p.250; Villard, 2009).  The brokers in the Roman banking houses who made books and 
offered odds on who would be elected,2 made Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini the 100 to 30 
(against) favourite, ahead of Cardinals Guiliano della Rovere (100 to 15) and Georges 
d’Amboise (the favourite if judged by the vocal support of the street crowds) at 100 to 13 
(Baumgartner, 2003 p.88)  Although Piccolomini is thought to have trailed in the first round 
of voting with 4 votes to 13 for d’Amboise and 15 for della Rovere, Piccolomini apparently 
benefited from a switch of votes from d’Amboise to himself in subsequent voting, and duly 
became Pope Pius III.  The bookmakers were proved right. 
The next conclave for which we have the betting odds is that of December, 1521, in 
which odds were offered on no fewer than twenty cardinals. Giulio de’Medici, the cousin of 
Leo X, was the betting favourite, at 100 to 25 (4 to 1), followed closely by Cardinal 
Alessandro Farnese at 100 to 20 (5 to 1), whose odds shortened to 100 to 40 (5 to 2) after a 
Roman mob plundered his house (Baumgartner, 2003 pp. 95-6).  Though Farnese at one point 
came close to being elected Pope, he could not reach the required two-thirds of the vote 
                                                          
2 See Hunt (2012 pp. 367-8) for details of how and where they conducted their operations. 
(Brewer, 1920 p. 798), and ultimately the cardinals looked outside of the conclave, electing 
Adrian of Utrecht as Pope Adrian VI. 
During the papal conclave of 1549-1550, Dandolo describes how Cardinal Gianmaria 
del Monte (who was eventually elected Julius III) had opened in the betting as the 5 to 1 
(against) favourite, but within three days Cardinal Reginald Pole had been established at odds 
of 4 to 1 (CSP, 1970 p.274-6).  On December 5, as balloting began, Pole was clear favourite 
at 100 to 95.  On that day, he received 26 of the 28 votes that would have given him the two-
thirds majority required to elect him Pontiff.  Although on the point of being made Pope by 
acclamation, Pole insisted on waiting until he won the formal two-thirds majority 
(Baumgartner, 1985 p. 306).  By the time that four additional French cardinals, opposed to 
Pole, arrived December 11, however, he was trading at 5 to 2, and a month later he was being 
offered at odds of 100 to 16 (Baumgartner, 2003 pp.108-9).  Dandolo had reported to his 
superiors early in the conclave: “It is more than clear that the merchants are very well 
informed about the state of the poll, and that the cardinals’ attendants in Conclave go partners 
with them in wagers, which this causes many tens of thousands of scudi (crowns) to change 
hands” (CSP, 1970 p.281). 
The first 1590 conclave, in September, is the earliest in which reports of insider 
trading emerged, when two of the key influencers of votes in the conclave, Cardinals 
Montalto and Sforza secretly agreed to join forces in support of Niccolo Sfondrato. It is 
reported that both made fortunes betting on him, at odds of 10 to 1 the day before he was 
elected as Pope Urban VII.  As the conclave opened, he was trading at 100 to 11, compared 
to Giambattista Castagna, who was offered at 100 to 22 (Baumgartner, 2003). During the 
second conclave of 1590, Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti at one point increased to 70 per cent in 
the betting.3  The odds were not reflected in the outcome, when Giovanni Battista Castagna 
became Pope Urban VII. 
Johnson (1974) reports bookmaker odds in Milan for the 1958 conclave which show 
Cardinal Angelo Roncalli the 2 to 1 favourite, followed by Cardinals Agagianian and 
Ottaviani at 3 to 1, then Stefan Wyszynski and Giuseppe Siri at 4 to 1.  The odds were 
justified when Roncalli became Pope John XXIII. 
For the first conclave of 1978, bookmakers in London were offering odds of 5 to2 
about Cardinal Sergio Pignedoli, 7 to 2 about Sebastian Baggio and Ugo Poletti and 4 to 1 
about Carlo Benelli.  The best odds about a non-Italian were 8 to 1 about Johannes 
                                                          
3 BAV, Ur. Lat 1058, October 13, 1590, fol. 525v, cited in Hunt (2012). 
Willebrands.  Of these only Pignedoli showed any strength in the voting, unconfirmed reports 
of the voting indicating that he obtained about 18 votes in the first ballot, compared to about 
23 for Albino Luciani and 25 for Giuseppe Siri.  Ultimately, Luciani became Pope John Paul 
I. 
For the second conclave of 1978, following the death of Pope John Paul I, the 
Associated Press, on October 14, noted that: 
“Once again, there is no odds-on favourite to be elected as the new pope of the 
Roman Catholic Church …. Those mentioned most often were Corradi Ursi, 70, of 
Naples; Salvatore Pappalardo, 60, of Plaermo, Sicily; Ugo Poletti, 64, of Rome; 
Giuseppe Siri, 72, of Genoa; Giovanni Colombo, 75, of Milan; Giovanni Benelli, 57, 
of Florence, and Antonio Poma, 68, of Bologna … Non-Italian front-runners included 
Argentinian Eduardo Pironio, 57, and Dutchman Johannes Willebrands, 68.”  4 
In fact, Cardinal Carol Wojtyla, archbishop of Krakow, became Pope John Paul II, after the 
eighth ballot 
In 2005, the man who became Pope Benedict XVI, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, opened 
in the betting, according to the odds offered by the bookmaker, Paddy Power, at 12 to 1. At 
that point, William Hill made Cardinal Arinze favourite, with Archbishop Tettamanzi, 
Cardinal Ratzinger and Cardinal Hummes as others to watch (Fleishman, 2005).  At 
lunchtime Tuesday, April 19, after three ballots, Ratzinger was favourite on two out of the 
three online betting boards monitored by CNN,5 and by the last day of the conclave had 
shortened to a clear 3 to 1 favourite. 
Toman (2004) analyses the dynamics of conclave voting using data collected from 
seven conclaves, beginning with the election of Benedict XV in 1914 to John Paul II in 1978.  
Modelling the election procedure using a linear feedback count panel data model, she found 
three significant patterns.  First, that the number of votes obtained during the previous ballot 
is strongly and positively correlated with the votes obtained during the ongoing ballot.  
Secondly, she found a momentum effect, so that the growth in votes a cardinal obtains 
between the previous ballot (at time t-1) and the one before that (time t-2) is positively 
correlated with votes obtained during the current ballot (time t).  In other words, candidates 
tend to give more votes to a cardinal whose votes are seen as growing, and vice-versa. 
Finally, the effect of “nocturnal conversations” (discussions made after the end of the day) 
                                                          
4 http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/election-of-a-pope-tests-betting-markets/ 
5 CNN.com, Bookmakers lay odds on new pope, Tammy Oaks, April 19, 2005. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/04/18/pope.betting/ 
tends to sizeably reduce the number of votes obtained by the cardinal leading in the vote.  A 
possible explanation for this finding is that these conversations allow cardinals to coordinate 
and hinder the election of the leading cardinal.6 
In summary, papal conclaves do have some history, dating back to 1503, of electing 
one of the favourites in the betting, but this is by no means a general rule, and there is some 
evidence of predictable patterns of voting. The historical evidence is that the betting markets 
have a patchy record in assimilating information about the identity of the next Pope, but there 
is clear historic evidence, not least from tracking movements in the betting odds during the 
course of the conclave, that the markets do show evidence of having picked up in a number of 
documented cases genuine information of predictive value about the outcome of papal 
elections. 
 
3. The 2013 Conclave 
We now turn to the 2013 conclave which eventually led to the election of Cardinal Jorge 
Bergoglio as Pope Francis I.  In the run-up to the conclave, a survey of Vatican watchers7 by 
YouTrend.It listed Cardinal Timothy Dolan of the United States as the second most likely 
Pope, after Cardinal Angelo Scola, followed in order by Cardinals Marc Ouellet, Odilo 
Scherer and Thomas O’Malley.  Luis Tagle of the Philippines was ranked sixth. 
An analysis was also reported in the National Catholic Register8of the likely age of 
the incoming Pope based on three trends – age at vacancy, length of reign and age at election. 
In terms of age at leaving office, the last several Popes (except for John Paul 1) were over 80 
years old, a result of a rising trend over the last 500 years. A similar rising trend in the length 
of reign indicates that a reign of 15 years is now an indicative guideline. An upward, though 
less steep, upward trend in the age at election, indicates that someone in their late 60s (around 
68) is a good guideline. In conclusion, this analysis pinpointed the expected age of the new 
pope to be about 68, to be expected to reign for about 15 years. More generally, the analysis 
concluded that “the next pope is likely to be between 60 and 70.” Of the 115 cardinal 
electors, 47 were in this age range. Jorge Bergoglio (76) was not one of them. 
                                                          
6 See also: www.linkiesta.it/blogs/una-firma-di-tutto-riposo/how-do-cardinals-vote-statistical-analysis-papal-
conclaves 
7 www.youtrend.it/2013/03/12/totopapa-sondaggio-youtrend-vaticanisti-previsioni-papabili/ 
8 Akin, J, How Old Will the Next Pope Be? National Catholic Register, February 25, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.ncregister.com/blog/jimmy-akin/how-old-will-the-next-pope-be 
Of perhaps more significance than age is country or region of origin.  In particular, a 
Pew Research Report9 examining the regional distribution of the world’s Catholics showed 
that while 65% of Catholics lived in Europe in 1910, by 2010 that had declined to 24%, while 
the share in Latin American –Caribbean countries rose from 24% to 39%, in Asia-Pacific 
countries from 5% to 12%, in Sub-Saharan Africa from less than one per cent to 16%, and in 
North America from 5% to 8%. Middle East-North African countries made up less than one 
per cent in both periods. Of arguably more importance than the regional distribution of the 
world’s Catholics, however, may be the regional distribution of the 115 attending Cardinal 
electors. Of these, 28 were from Italy, 32 from the Rest of Europe, 20 from North America, 
13 from South America, 11 from Africa and 11 from Asia (including the Middle East) and 
Oceania. For the 2005 conclave, the corresponding figures were 39 from Italy, 30 from the 
Rest of Europe, 17 from North America, 9 from South America, 10 from Africa and 10 from 
Asia (including the Middle East) and Oceania. 
An assessment released on March 12, 2013, noted that “Almost like clockwork since 
1878, every election has alternated between producing a favourite, and an almost complete 
surprise.  In 2005, 1963, 1939, 1914 and 1878 the Cardinal Electors played it safe, while in 
1978 (twice), 1958, 1922 and 1903 they were prepared to ‘roll the dice’, often in order to 
break a deadlocked conclave.  If this pattern holds, 2013 will produce a (late) surprise … 
Could the surprise be the first non-European pope in 1,282 years? …. After all, two-thirds of 
Catholics now reside outside of Europe, forecast to grow to three-quarters by 2050 …”10 
What is most notable about the pre-conclave speculations was how little attention was 
paid by observers to the chances of Cardinal Bergoglio.  John Allen Jr. (the Vatican expert 
for the US publication, The National Catholic Reporter) was unusual in at least profiling 
Bergoglio as a possible contender, albeit in the context of profiles over twenty other 
‘papabile’, although he was rather ambivalent about Bergoglio’s chances.11 
We now look at events during the process of the conclave itself.  We are particularly 
interested in examining how much new information (either private or public) that became 
available during the conclave might have influenced perceptions about the outcome.  We 
focus on four significant events as follows: 
A. 18:41 GMT on Weds 12th March. This is when the first black smoke appeared, 
indicating that the Cardinal electors had not agreed on a pope following the first 
                                                          
9 Pew Research Religion & Public Life Project, February 13, 2013, ‘The Global Catholic Population.’ Available 
at: http://www.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population/ 
10 Rod Crosby, http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/papabile-day-men-who-could-be-pope-13 
11http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/papabile-day-men-who-could-be-pope-13 
round of ballots. At this point in time, the Cardinals exit the Sistine chapel where 
the voting takes place, and the first opportunity arises for the leaking of private 
information on the first voting tallies. 
B. 08:10 GMT, publication of a ‘Vatican Insider’12 report in La Stampa by Vatican 
reporter, Giacomo Galeazzi, identifying the group of candidates leading the ballot, 
namely Cardinals Dolan, Ouellet, Scherer, Scola and Bergoglio.  This is the first 
and only report in the public domain claiming to know the state of the voting, and 
was offering what we now know to have been reliable information on the progress 
of the ballot.  This was the also the first credible report indicating that Cardinal 
Bergoglio was a serious contender. What is particularly important to note here is 
that ‘Vatican Insider’, and Giacomo Galeazzi in particular, are sources which 
were at the time already very well regarded by informed observers.13 
C. 10:38 GMT, second black smoke revealing that the second round of ballots had 
not led to a Pope being elected.  This indicates a second point in time when new, 
but private information was available. 
D. 11:12 GMP, updated reported by Galeazzi, suggesting that, in the most recent 
round of voting, the shortlist of candidates had reduced to just three: Scola, 
Ouellet and Bergoglio.  At 11.57am, the Guardian, a UK national newspaper with 
a significant Internet presence, reported on the two Galeazzi articles on their 
Liveblog, thus bringing this information to the attention of a much wider, English-
speaking audience. 
A subsequent report, published in La Repubblica after the election of the Pope, claims 
that Scola received approximately 35 votes in the first vote, to 20 for Bergoglio and 15 for 
Ouellet,14 an account backed up in broad terms by informal post-conclave interviews with 
five cardinal electors by John Allen Jr. at the National Catholic Reporter - which additionally 
reported support for Scherer.  Allen continues that “After two rounds of voting Wednesday 
morning, it had become clear that neither Scola nor Scherer were likely to cross the finish 
line and gain the 77 votes needed for election … The fourth ballot, the first of Wednesday 
afternoon, saw Bergoglio separate himself from the pack.”15 
                                                          
12 http://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/en/about-us/ 
13 http://ncronline.org/blogs/all-things-catholic/ferment-religious-life-new-american-leader-and-vatican-
insider 
14 www.ilvelino.it/it/article/orenove5-papa-in-conclave-un-plebiscito-quasi-cento-voti/493c9365-6d5a-44a7-
9763-11c9364f38d3 
15 John L. Allen Jr., Path to the Papacy: ‘Not Him, Not Him, Therefore Him’, National Catholic Reporter, 
March 17, 2013, http://ncronline.org/news/global/path-papacy-not-him-not-him-therefore-him 
So it is clear that both Galeazzi reports on the outcomes of each round of voting (the 
second one subsequently picked up and reported in the Guardian’s ‘Liveblog’) are cases in 
which accurate information, of great significance to the eventual outcome, was made publicly 
available.  It is interesting to observe that even the order of listing of the names coincided 
with the vote tally as reported on 19th March in La Repubblica.  More importantly, by 
comparing the Galeazzi update with the earlier report, it is clear that Bergoglio’s vote tally 
was rising, while the early front-runners had failed to reach the required two-thirds majority 
by the time of the ‘nocturnal conversations’.  For these reasons, we might have expected the 
reports to have led to a surge of betting interest on Cardinal Bergoglio, unless there was good 
reason to question the credibility of the Vatican Insider reports. We might also expect to have 
seen a flight of money away from previously favoured candidates not mentioned in the 
reports. 
In the next section we examine how the extent to which prices for the key contenders 
actually responded to the release of both private and public information. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
We focus on prices during the final twenty four hours of the conclave betting market.  For our 
purposes, price is defined as the probability of a contender winning the election as implied by 
the Betfair odds.  As described above, during this time, we identify four key time points (A to 
D) at which significant additional information was potentially available to the market. 
Events A and C provided public information to the extent that they revealed that no 
Pope had been elected. More importantly, however, at these points, insiders who were aware 
of the breakdown of votes in the inconclusive ballots would have been in possession of 
information unavailable to the general public regarding the likely prospects of the key 
contenders.  In principle, this information could have been exploited to engage in insider 
trading on the betting markets. 
Events B and D indicate points at which that same information was made publicly 
available.  At 11:57 on 13th March (a little under one hour after Event D, the publication of 
the second La Stampa article) the Guardian live blog reported on the article, naming the three 
remaining contenders and hence publicising this information more widely to an English-
speaking audience.  We consider the implications of the publication of the Guardian blog 
below. 
The betting data we use comes from Betfair, the world’s largest person-to-person 
betting exchange.16  Betfair supplied us with a unique dataset comprising a complete record 
of every bet (recorded and time-stamped in-running) for every candidate in the papal election.  
Each record includes the amount bet, the price achieved and the timestamp.  For the majority 
of our analysis we aggregate the data up to the hourly level to ensure there is a reasonable 
level of liquidity.  The mean size of a wager in the papal conclave was just over £10.  In total, 
over the course of the market, over 17,000 bets were placed giving a total sum wagered of 
£180,312. Anyone based in Italy, however, at the point of trading, was not able to place a bet 
through Betfair on the conclave. 
Our approach is to track graphically prices at the end of each hour on the betting 
markets of the main contenders over the final twenty four hours of the conclave market and to 
examine the effect on prices at each of these points.  We identify two groups of contenders.  
The first group comprises the five Cardinals identified by La Stampa (and subsequently 
verified by other sources) as having attracted significant numbers of ballots in the early 
rounds of voting.  The second group comprises the six other Cardinals who were most 
favoured in the betting odds at the opening of the market, specifically Cardinals Bertone, 
Erdo, O’Malley, Schonborn, Tagle and Turkson. 
Having examined the impact of our four events on the prices of each cardinal, we then 
go on to estimate a formal econometric model of market efficiency for each of the three main 
contenders (as revealed by the second La Stampa report and subsequently verified by other 
sources).  We use a standard approach to testing for information inefficiencies by testing 
whether past movements in asset prices can be used to predict positive returns.  On the 
assumption of an efficient market, current returns should follow a random walk process and 
lagged returns should have no explanatory power.  When estimating such models, it is 
important to take account of the impact of time-varying volatility, or Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) (Engle, 1982).  Not doing so is likely to lead to 
biased and inconsistent estimates.  There exist a whole class of models to deal with ARCH 
effects.  Most common in the analysis of asset prices is the use of Generalised ARCH 
(GARCH) models (Bollerslev, 1986).  In these models, the time-dependent volatility is 
estimated as a function of observed prior volatility, measured as the lagged value(s) of the 
squared regression disturbances and, also, lagged value(s) of the conditional variance.  The 
order of the GARCH model is given by the number of lags in each case. 
                                                          
16 A betting exchange is an on-line trading platform provides clients of the exchange with the facility to offer or 
accept odds about the outcome of a future event. 
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 In the context of market efficiency for asset prices, the GARCH(p, q) model can be 
represented as follows: 
      (1) 
   
      (2) 
 
where Rt represents returns in hour t, t is assumed to follow a normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance 2; i are the ARCH parameters; i are the GARCH 
parameter(s).  We define returns on hour t in the normal way as Rt = log(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt is 
the betting price for the contender at the end of hour t.  We use the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal lag length of the ARCH and GARCH parameters. 
We supplement equation 1 by the inclusion of dummy variables for each of the four 
time points identified above.  We include one lag of event D (publication of the second La 
Stampa article) to allow for the further dissemination of the information via the Guardian.  
Significant coefficients on dummy variables for events A and C will provide information on 
the extent to which private information held by insiders was incorporated into the market.  
The coefficients for events B and D indicate how the market incorporated public information.  
We would expect the effect of these dummy variables to vary with each contender.  In 
particular, for Cardinal Bergoglio who was not originally considered by the markets to be a 
realistic contender, we would expect a significant and positive coefficient for the two public 
information dummies.  A positive coefficient for the two private information dummies would 
indicate significant trading by insiders on the basis of such information. 
We estimate this model using hourly data from the opening of the market as 21.00 
GMT on the 28th February until the close of the market at 18.00 GMT on the 13th March.  
This gives us a total of 310 observations. 
 
5. Results 
In Figures 1a and 1b we track hourly mean price for individual Cardinals in the critical final 
24 hours period of betting.  We present plots for two groups of Cardinals.  The first is those 
identified ex post as having attracted significant numbers of votes in the early rounds.  The 
second are those cardinals who were expected to poll well prior to voting but who were 
identified ex post as receiving few or no votes. 
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Taking each of our events in turn, event A (the first appearance of black smoke) 
indicates a time at which insiders would have been aware that the first group of cardinals 
(reported in Figure 1) were all still in the running, whereas the chances of those in the second 
group (who had originally attracted a lot of betting but did not attract many or any votes) had 
clearly been overestimated.  In fact, the time paths provide very little evidence that insiders 
exploited this information to any significant degree.  In many cases, prices changed very little 
after that point or continued on a previously established trend. Indeed, in some cases the 
graphs suggest a perverse effect.  For example, Cardinal Turkson’s price increased markedly 
in the period soon after event A, contrary to what we would expect if insiders were exploiting 
their private information.  Looking at the two candidates (Bergoglio and Dolan) who attracted 
votes despite previously not being thought of as serious contenders, if anything prices seem 
to drop after event A.  A close look at the minute-by-minute data for Bergoglio confirms an 
increase in volatility around the time of event A, and the price eventually settles at a lower 
value than before the black smoke, the opposite to what we would expect had the private 
information made available at that point (namely that Bergoglio had attracted a significant 
number of votes) been exploited in the markets. 
Event B indicates the point at which the private information becomes public.  Again, 
there is little consistent pattern in the data to suggest that the markets successfully 
incorporated this information.  Indeed, there is very little movement in prices at all at this 
point. 
Event C (the second appearance of black smoke) marks the second period in which 
there was the potential for insider trading.  This period lasts just one hour before the voting 
information was made public by La Stampa (event D).  Again, there is no clear evidence that 
the prices of the candidates reacted in a way consistent with what we would expect if there 
was insider trading, although Bergoglio’s price does appear to increase marginally after this 
point.  At the time of Event D, Bergoglio’s odds of winning appear to drop at first (again the 
opposite of what we would expect).  His price eventually rises significantly, in line with 
expectations, and the timing of this lagged response matches the subsequent re-posting of the 
La Stampa report by The Guardian..  There are other apparent inconsistencies.  For example, 
Schonborn’s odds of winning increase markedly soon after Event D, despite there being no 
public indication (as far as we are aware) to indicate an increase in his chances. 
We now go on to look at standard market efficiency regressions for some of the main 
candidates: Cardinals Bergoglio, Ouellet and Scherer.  As explained above, we employ a 
simple GARCH specification using hourly data over the course of the whole market.  We also 
include dummy variables for the hour of occurrence of each of the four events discussed 
above.  The key results are reported in Table 1. 
Taking the market for Cardinal Bergoglio first, there is no overall evidence of market 
inefficiency in that mean returns (as revealed by the constant term) are not significantly 
different from zero and the lagged returns variable has no significant explanatory power.  In 
contrast, for both Ouellet and Scola, the coefficient on lagged returns is negative and 
significant suggesting that lagged returns have significant explanatory power. 
The results for the four timed events presents us with a mixed picture.  The 
appearance of the first black smoke is associated with significantly negative returns for 
Bergoglio and Ouellet, the opposite to what we would expect had insiders used the private 
information that these candidates had attracted a significant number of votes in the early 
rounds.  The second private information event (second black smoke) is more consistent with 
expectations: for both Bergoglio and Ouellet the coefficient on the dummy variable is 
positive and significant. 
Looking at the revelation of public information regarding voting patterns, the 
publication of the first La Stampa article appears to have had little or no effect on returns for 
Bergoglio.  This is striking given that it was the first appearance of any information 
indicating that he was a front-runner.  Intriguingly, the second episode of additional public 
information (the second La Stampa article) is associated with negative returns at first and 
only when the Guardian blog further disseminated this information, do returns become 
strongly positive and significant.  Taken together, these results are suggestive of the markets 
processing information in an inconsistent manner and also of significant lags in the 
processing of public information. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
In summary, there is evidence of some reaction in the betting market to the breaking 
information relating to the outcome of the conclave, but in retrospect a clear under-reaction in 
terms of both extent and speed of incorporation. We note in particular what we might term 
the ‘Galeazzi anomaly’. 
In general, online person to person betting markets provide excellent potential for 
insiders to exploit any inefficiencies in the way the market adjusts to new information.  The 
costs of entry into the Betfair market are low, simply a small up-front deposit into the trading 
account, and the market was reasonably liquid for clients of the exchange.  However, it was 
not possible to trade from Italy with Betfair on the Conclave. This institutional feature may 
explain, at least partly, why the market was slow to adjust to newly revealed information.  
That said, given that the relevant information was widely available and publicised in the UK 
where Betfair is much better known and very accessible, this is unlikely to be anywhere close 
to a complete solution. 
What can we conclude from these findings?  Either that the public release of accurate 
information from a generally well respected news source was not (for good or bad reason on 
this occasion) sufficiently believed by those able to place a trade on the exchange, or else it 
was significantly overlooked by traders. In other words, the betting market did not perform as 
well as might have been expected in terms of responding to new public information, which 
given its provenance and authoritative tone might have been expected to be accurate, and 
which turned out to be so.  This cannot be explained in terms of the fog of conflicting signals 
as there were no other credible sources issuing conflicting information. 
More generally, the main lesson we can perhaps take from this analysis is that 
decisions taken by individuals or groups of individuals whose choices are shrouded, at least 
from outsiders, in a layer of secrecy, may not always be as impenetrable as conventional 
wisdom about the secrecy of the deliberations might suggest.  Rather, it is a question of 
knowing where to look for the information, and identifying which information to believe. 
We venture that in the context of the most recent papal election, sufficient credible 
information was in the public domain to allow profitable exploitation of this information, yet 
markets failed to reflect this.  To this extent, it reinforces the conclusion of Vaughan 
Williams (2014) about the relative predictive power of expert forecasters (American Bar 
Association) and a major real-money betting exchange market in identifying the high-profile 
outcome of the 2012 US Supreme Court decision on the ‘Affordable Care Act.’ 
This failure of the market to aggregate information in an effective way stands in clear 
conflict with the weight of evidence found in many other studies of prediction markets. We 
infer that the divergence in the efficiency of prediction markets in this context, as also found 
in relation to the high-profile 2012 US Supreme Court decision on the ‘Affordable Care Act’, 
can be attributed to the very different processes of evaluation used to discern and properly 
weight information flows in the context of open-door and closed-door decision-making. 
We propose that further research might seek to examine whether the same clear 
divergence in market efficiency can be found in the context of other examples of open and 
closed-door decision-making. 
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Figure 1a: Hourly prices for the 5 main Papal Contenders 
 
 
Figure 1b: Hourly prices for the selected other Papal contenders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(i) Graphs cover the period from 12:00 GMT on the 12th March 2013 until the closing of the market at 18:00 
GMT on the 13th March 2013. 
(ii) Price is the probability of that candidate being elected as implied by the Betfair odds on matched bets. 
(iii) Vertical lines indicate the timing of each of the events A to D (as described in the text) in order. 
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Figure 2a: Bergoglio prices minute by minute 
 
 
Figure 2b: Scola prices minute by minute 
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Figure 2c: Ouellet prices minute by minute 
 
 
Figure 2d: Bertone prices minute by minute 
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Figure 2e: Turkson minute by minute 
 
Notes: 
(i) Graphs cover the period from 12:00 GMT on the 12th March 2013 until 14:00 on the 13th March 2013. 
(ii) Price is the probability of that candidate being elected as implied by the Betfair odds. 
(iii) Vertical lines indicate the timing of each of the events A to D (as described in the text) in order.  The 5th line 
indicates the Guardian report which further disseminated the public information revealed at point D. 
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 Table 1: ARCH Estimates of Returns in Papal Contender Markets 
 1 2 3 
 Bergoglio Ouellet Scola 
Return (t-1) -0.116 
(0.130) 
-0.283*** 
(0.087) 
-0.334*** 
(0.111) 
A. Black Smoke 1 -0.937*** 
(0.200) 
-0.187*** 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.050) 
B. La Stampa 1 -0.003 
(0.171) 
0.065*** 
(0.013) 
0.053*** 
(0.005) 
C. Black Smoke 2 0.121*** 
(0.034) 
0.364*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
D. La Stampa 2 -0.067*** 
(0.020) 
0.127 
(0.123) 
0.131*** 
(0.003) 
La Stampa 2 (t-1) 0.759*** 
(0.015) 
-0.328*** 
(0.093) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Constant 0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
1.233 e-4 
(3.73 e-3) 
    
Log-Likelihood 177.39 343.63 443.09 
AIC -336.78 -669.26 -868.18 
N 310 310 310 
    
 
Notes 
(i) Sample period is 21.00 GMT on 28th Feb until 18.00 GMT on 13th March. 
(ii) Dependent variable is the Betfair return for hour t, defined as log(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt is the mean Betfair price 
at the end of hour t. 
(iii) Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
(iv) *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level;* at the 10% level. 
(v) AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion for model selection and is calculated as AIC = -2(L - k) where k is 
the number of parameters being estimated.  The AIC suggests a maximum lag order of one for the ARCH and 
GARCH terms. 
 
